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EAST TIMOR INDONESIAN OCCUPATION AND GENOCIDE

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EAST TIMOR INDONESIAN OCCUPATION AND GENOCIDE

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1. EAST TIMOR, AN OIL-RICH FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONY SLIGHTLY LARGER THAN KUWAIT

Timor, with an area of approximately 32,000 square kilometers, is the largest island of the Sunda arcdhipelago. Its total area is slightly greater than that of Belgium and nearly a fourth of the area of the island of Java. On Java (with an area of 130,000 square kilometrers), there lives a population of approximately one hundred and ten million Indonesians. (To compare the area of East Timor with that of other territories, see Table I).

East Timor is made up of the territories of the former colony of Portuguese Timor, including not only the eastern half of the island, but also the enclave of Oe-Cusse, Atauro Island, and the islet of Jaco, with a total area of 18,899 square kilometers' (an area slightly than that of Kuwait's larger 17,818 square kilometers). Dili, the capital, is located 600 kilometers from Darwin (the closest Australian airport) and approximately 2,000 kilometers from Jakarta, (the capital of Indonesia) on the island of Java. The offshore oil reserves in the Sea of Timor, between East Timor and Australia, are considered to be among the twenty largest such deposits in the world.

The western part of the island of Timor is part of Indonesia, in view of the fact that it was part of the Dutch West Indies, which became independent at the end of World War II.

At the beginning of 1975, the territory had a population of 700,000 inhabitants (aproximately half that of Kuwait in 1991).

EAST TIMOR
ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS


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Suai
OE-CUSSE
WEST TIMOR
(Indonesia)
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2. A TERRITORY UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION, WITH CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF INDONESIA.

When the first Portuguese missionaries and merchants reached Timor around 1515, they encountered the population organized into small states, which were divided into two confederations of kingdoms (Servião and Belos), where animistic religions held sway. Islam, the most influential religion in Indonesia, had not reached Timor, as was also the case with Buddhism, which had become increasingly influential in Java in the eighth century.

During the third quarter of the sixteenth century the first Portuguese Dominican friars settled permanently in the territory, exercising progressively greater cultural and religious influence, while Portuguese dominance was being consolidated. Timorese culture thus evolved in a direction which was diametrically opposed to that of Java, Sumatra, and the Kalimantan and Sulawesi coasts, where the growing influence of Islam made itself felt.

While nearly 87% of Indonesia's population of 180 million people consider themselves Muslims, in 1970 nearly a third of the Timorese population was Catholic and only 0.04% (a total of 234 persons) were Muslims. Two-thirds of the population remainned faithful to traditional animist beliefs. Nowadays, more than 80% of Timorese are Catholics.

In 1651 the Dutch conquered Kupang on the western end of the island and began to penetrate into the western half of Timor. Thus, the colonial division of the island has existed for quite some time. In 1859, a treaty signed by Portugal and the Netherlands established the border between Portuguese Timor (East Timor) and Dutch Timor (West Timor).

In 1945 and in June 1974 the Indonesian government, in accordance with international law, affirmed both in the United Nations and on other occasions that it had no territorial pretensions whatsoever toward East Timor.

In 1960, East Timor was considered by the United Nations as a non-autonomous territory under Portuguese administration, according to Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. After 1962 and until 1973 the General Assembly of the United Nations approved successive resolutions recognizing the right to self-determination of East Timor (and of all existing Portuguese colonies). The dictatorial regime of Salazar (and later, of Caetano) refused to recognize this right, affirming that East Timor was a Portuguese province equal to any other.

The 25 April Revolution, which restored democracy in Portugal, supported the right to self-determination for the former Portuguese colonies. In order to foster the exercise of this right, a Committee for Self-Determination of East Timor was created on 13 May 1974, in Dili, the capital of the territory.

On 27 July 1974, Law nº 7/74 explicitily affirmed "*the right to self- determination with all its consequences*", including the "*acceptance of the independence of the overseas territories*".

On 3 August 1974 Portugal delivered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a Memorandum in which it declares its willingness to cooperate fully with the United Nations, in accordance with the Declaration on the concession of independence to colonial peoples and territories. In doing so, Portugal thus recognized the status of East Timor as a non-autonomous territory, and acknowledged its own role as administering Power. This is the legal framework which the United Nations and other international organizations have repeatedly recognized and affirmed, up to the present time.

3. IN 1974-75 PORTUGAL BEGINS THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION IN TIMOR BUT INDONESIAN INTERVENTION PREVENTS IT FROM DOING SO SUCCESSFULLY

In accordance with the democratic and anti-colonial principles of the April Revolution, the Portuguese government authorized the creation of political parties in Timor. Three such organizations appeared in East Timor:

UDT (Timorese Democratic Union), founded on 11 May 1974, which began by proposing "*progressive autonomy... but always under the Portuguese flag*", and which, in its defense of self-determination, proposed "*the integration of Timor in a commonwealth of Portuguese-speaking countries*;

ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic Association), created on 20 May 1974, which defended "*The right to independence (progressive autonomy with the ultimate goal of independence)*". On 11 September 1974 ASDT became known as FRETILIN;

APODETI (Popular Democratic Association of Timor), which was created on 27 May, and which proposed "*integration with autonomy within the Indonesian community*".

The Portuguese authorities were totally open to any solution, including integration with Indonesia, as long as it was the result of the free choice of the Timorese people, in accordance with the stipulations of international law and United Nations resolutions. This was clearly affirmed in several meetings between Portuguese and Indonesian leaders.

The first step toward self-determination had thus been taken, with the creation of these political organizations and with the freedom with which they were allowed to divulge their ideas. In May 1975 a project of the Lisbon authorities was presented to the three largest Timorese political parties. After hearing their opinions, Law 7/75, which proposed the appointment of a Portuguese High Commissioner and the election, in October of the same year, of a Timorense Popular Assembly which would define the political status of the territory, was published on 11 June 1975. A transition period of three years was anticipated.

Beginning in January 1975, a local program of progressive decolonization was inaugurated, specifically through administrative reform and the reorganization of the educational system. Teaching methods as well as programs and curricula (which at the time were identical to those of the former Portuguese colonies) were adapted to the realities and necessities of Timor. The program of administrative reform led to the realization of elections for the regional administration of the county of Lautem. The results of this first popular vote, in August 1975 — which would later be extended to the othner twelve counties of the territory — demonstrated a marked lack of support for APODETI, and were an extremely significant factor in Indonesian's decison to destabilize and invade the territory, annexing it by force, as it had become obvious that the Timorese would never accept integration with the neighboring country through democratic processes.

Long before the regional elections it had become clear to any independent visitor to the territory that the overwhelming majoritity of Timorese were totally opposed to integration with Indonesia. The cultural differences to which we have referred were one of the major reasons for this rejection.

Indonesia had therefore, along with propaganda camapaigns in favor of integration, undertaken actions of provocation designed to destabilize the situation in the territory. At the same time, it easily encountered international support for its pro-annexation policies, due to the geopolitical situation at the time, to which we shall refer later.

Due to extremely weak popular support for APODETI, the Indonesian generals and government attempted to bribe or pressure the leaders of the parties to defend integration. Some of these leaders would denounce these manoevres in speeches before the United Nations Committee on Decolonization some years later.

The President of UDT, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, contradicting the program of his party, went along with Indonesian plans and caused the breakdown (on 27 May 1975) of the coalition between UDT and FRETILIN, which had been established on 20 January 1975, and which had been working toward independence in five to ten years. As if this were not enough, he managed to convince UDT to carry out a coup against the Portuguese authorities on the night of 10 August 1975.

Virtually without any operational forces in the territory (approximately seventy paratroopers), and due to the extremely serious situation of political instability existing in Portugal at the time (the fledgling democracy was on the brink of civil war), the Portuguese authorities in Timor were not able to control the situation.

The Indonesian hawks, led by Generals Ali Murtopo, Benny Murdani and Yoga Sugama, who in October 1974 unleashed *Operasi Komodo* (designed to destabilize and annex East Timor), had begun to receive the dividends of their policies of bribery, threats and provocation, in which the radio stations of Kupang and Atambua (on the Indonesian side of the island of Timor) participated.

When civil war broke out, with UDT and three small parties (APODETI, KOTA and the Labor Party) on one side and FRETILIN on the other, the Portuguese authorities withdrew to the island of Atauro, located approximately 30 kilometers from Dili. It was there, without any significant international support (while Indonesia received aid from America, Australia, and other countries), that they witnessed the Indonesian invasion of Dili. The twenty-three Portuguese soldiers and officers taken hostage by Indonesia at the time completed the picture of Portuguese impotence.

4. THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT CREATES FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE INVASION AND ANNEXATION OF EAST TIMOR BY INDONESIA.

On 17 April 1975, the Cambodian regime of Lon Nol, who had come to power in 1970 with American support, was overthrown. With the takeover of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge, the Communist regime of Pol Pot came into power. Nearly two weeks later, Saigon fell into the hands of Vietnamese Communists.

Two years earlier, in 1973, the Communist movement Pathet Lao had formed a coalition cabinet with the previous Vientiane government and had expelled American "*advisers*" and Thai troops. In April 1975 the Pathet Lao took power alone, abolishing the monarchy and transforming the country into the Lao Popular Democratic Republic.

These Communist advances in Indochina, where the United States had been so deeply involved both in military and political terms, along with the humiliating defeat in Vietnam, left the Americans traumatized and the Western countries (as well as those belonging to ASEAN), along with Australia and Japan, very worried indeed.

In addition to these concerns, developments on the Horn of Africa and in Africa were not favorable to the West. In September 1974, Hailé Selassié, Emperor of Ethiopia, was ousted, and in 1975, Angola and Mozambique attained independence under Marxist regimes.

In this context, the military regime of General Suharto, which had come to power by destroying one of the largest Communist parties in the world, the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), appeared to be the greatest barrier to Communist advances in the region, and was thus an essential factor in the defense of Western interests. The fact that

PKI was pro-Chinese and that Jakarta had maintained good relations with Moscow (though relations with Peking had been broken off after the 1965 coup) encouraged the Eastern bloc, led by the USSR, to show prudence and understanding in its relations with the Indonesian government.

In addition, it was known that the Sea of Timor, between Portuguese Timor and Australia, had sizable oil deposits. In the negotiations which took place in 1974-75 between Portugal and the Australian government to fix the maritime border, the latter did not manage to achieve all of its objectives. Therefore, the Australian ambassador in Jakarta reminded his govenment, in a telegram dated 17/8/75, that this border "*...would be more easily negotiable with Indonesia rather than with Portugal or with an independent Portuguese Timor*".

In this context, the Indonesian President General Suharto met with the Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in Wonosobo on the island of Java. At the end of the meeting the international press commented on "*Australian support for the integration of Timor with Indonesia*", affirming that "*the Australian Goverment feels that this solution for the island of Timor would ensure greater stability in the region*".

Curiously, it was only after this Australian/Indonesian position was made public that ASDT transformed itself on 11 September 1974 into a more radical movement, FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor). This new designation of the former ASDT, as well as the Marxist language of certain intellectuals belonging to the Front, were skillfully used by Indonesia to convince the world of the danger of the establishment of a Communist regime in East Timor, and thus to gain Western support for its pro-annexation policies.

In July 1975 the Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Jakarta wrote in a report to the British Foreign Ministry:

"(...) seen from here it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon and as unobtrusively as possible; and that if it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the United nation we should keep our heads down and avoid siding against the Indonesian government".

While the American Embassy received instructions from Kissinger not to get involved in discussions on East Timor with the Indonesians, and to eliminate references to the territory in its reports, the American ambassador Newson commented *"(...) if Indonesia were to intervene the United States woull hope they would do so effectively, quickley and not use our equipment"*.

On 5-6 December 1975 President Gerald Ford of the United States of America and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta, where they are said to have assured General Suharto that supplies of American weapons would not be affected by the military action which would begin after their departure.

As *The Nation* revealed fifteen years later, the greatest concern of Secretary of State Kissinger, winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace and great American strategist, was not that of preventing the invasion or even avoiding the use of American weapons in Indonesian aggression against East Timor, but rather that of keeping public opinion from finding out about American involvement and thus provoking a reaction on the part of the United States Congress cutting off military support to the invading power.

In the invasion, American-made Hercules transport planes were used, along with other equipment supplied by the United States American military aid to Indonesia was doubled the following year. In September 1976 the U. S. supplied Indonesia with the first Bronco OV-10 planes, especially conceived to put down armed insurrections. With these planes, with American helicopters designed for the war in Vietnam, and with military equipment supplied by other countries who allegedly support human rights (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Holland,...), the Indonesian armed forces razed hundreds hundreds of Timorese villages and carried out authentic genocide against the Maubere people.

5. LACKING IN MILITARY FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, THE PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY AND PRESENT A COMPLAINT IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

In July 1975, President Suharto of Indonesia, on arriving in Jakarta after a trip to the United States of America, Canada, Japan, Iran and Yugoslavia, stated publicly that East Timor could not be independent, due to the alleged inviability of the territory in economic terms. He added that continued links to Portugal no longer made sense, and that the future of East Timor lay in integration with Indonesia.

In order to confirm the position of the neighboring country some UDT leaders traveled on 25 July to Jakarta, where they had an important meeting with General Ali Murtopo and his staff on 2 August 1975. On returning to Dili on the sixth of the same month, after receiving threats and promises in Jakarta, they managed to convince the remaining leaders of UDT to carry out a coup four days later against the Portuguese authorities. After taking the airport, the broadcasting station and other key positions by force, UDT demanded the arrest of FRETILIN leaders and the immediate transfer of power to UDT.

With the coup of 10 August, Indonesia had finally attained the first objective of *Operasi Komodo*, that of destabilizing the situation in East Timor. Reforms in education, administration and other effective decolonization measures were interrupted. It was impossible for the government of Portuguese Timor to maintain military control over the entire territory, in view of the fact that it had at its disposal only seventy men (two platoons of paratroopers) as the only neutral non-Timorese operational force. The world political situation, the instability existing in Portugal in the "*hot summer*" of 1975 and the enormous distance (16,000 km) between Portugal and Timor made the sending of reinforcements impossible.

In these circunstances Portugal's only alternative was to attempt to reach a negociated solution under the auspices of the United Nations. With this objective, the Lisbon government sent an official mission to Timor headed by Major António Soares three days after the UDT coup. On passing through Jakarta, the mission was prevented by the Indonesian authorities from continuing its journey and forced to return to Portugal.

In Timor, Governor Lemos Pires attempted to establish a dialogue with the leaders of Timorese political parties. When an agreement seemed possible and the leaders of FRETILIN and UDT had made radio appeals for peace, the Indonesian station Radio Atambua broadcast incitements to violence, and the talks broke down.

In view of the impotence of the Portuguese authorities, and in order to put an end to the arrests and deaths provoked by UDT forces, on the night of 19 August 1975 Timorese military personnel who were FRETILIN sympathizers revolted and took over most military units. Portuguese officials, arrested for some hours, were released the following morning near the Officer's Mess. The civil war between FRETILIN and UDT began on 20 August.

Attempts to find a negotiated solution nonetheless continued. On 22 August a second mission, led by the Minister of Interterritorial Coordenation, went to New York to confer with the United Nations Secretary-General, and thence to Indonesia and Australia. The possibility of creating a Committee of Good Offices and a multinational peacekeeping force, including Portuguese, Australian, Indonesian and Malaysian elements, was considered. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry did not accept this offer, and made a counter-proposal to send exclusively Indonesian forces at once. Portugal rejected this Indonesian attempt to gain tacit approval for a military occupation of the territory.

In the meanwhile, following the instructions of Indonesian authorities, UDT forces imprisoned twenty-three Portuguese officers and soldiers, whom they handed over as hostages to the Indonesian authorities.

Fifteen days after the UDT coup, while the port area of Dili (where the few Portuguese troops were concentrated) was under crossfire, a radio message revealed that Indonesia was sending a ship to Dili to fetch and "take to a safe place" the Portuguese governor and his staff.

This was the destroyer *Mon Icidi.* In order to avoid being taken hostage by any of the belligerents and to obtain security conditions that would allow conversations between a ministerial mission — which had been sent from Lisbon — and the Timorese political parties, Governor Lemos Pires withdrew with his staff to the island of Ataúro, which is also part of Portuguese Timor and which is located about thirty kilometers across Dili Bay, on 26 August 1975. In this way they managed to escape from the trap prepared by the Indonesians, who had offered their protection with the idea that it would be the Portuguese governor himself who would request Indonesian military intervention. This attempt and similar advances by the Indonesian authorities to the Portuguese were always systematically rejected.

With the coup of 11 August against Portuguese administration and the increasingly pro-Indonesian attitudes on the part of some UDT leaders, this party quickly lost most of its popular support. On the other hand, FRETILIN, which had become the only movement which was in favor of genuine independence, gained considerable support. The numerical and military superiority of FRETILIN became so considerable that UDT's only alternative was to withdraw to the border between Portuguese Timor and Indonesia, whose protection it requested. Little more than a month after it had begun, the civil war came to an end on 24 September 1975, when UDT forces along with the leaders of APODETI, KOTA and the Labor Party, crossed the border and placed themselves in Indonesian hands.

In late September FRETILIN had control of the situation in all the eastern half of the island of Timor. This group sent insistent requests to the governments of other countries (especially those in the region) to send representatives to observe the situation in the territory. Under the pretext that this could be considered foreign interference which could jeopardize Portugal's role, these requests went unanswered. Only certain humanitarian organizations and foreign journalists answered this appeal. They were able to confirm FRETILIN's effective control of the territory, as well as the widespread popular support it enjoyed and the relative efficiency of the transitional authorities led by this front.

The Intenational Red Cross, invited to operate within the territory, carried out extraordinarily praiseworthy efforts in the area of health and medical assistence after the end of August. As Red Cross representatives were allowed to circulate freely, they visited all the areas where the civil war had been fought; the Mission Leader, André Pasquier, concluded that the number of casualities in the conflict was approximately one thousand five hundred. The situation in prisions was also observed, as FRETILIN authorized the visit of the Red Cross to all such institutions.

In the meantime, the Portuguese authorities maintained a symbolic presence on the island of Ataúro. UDT, as well as the twenty-three officers and soldiers held hostage, were in Indonesian hands. APODETI had so few supporters that its role in the civil war was virtually nonexistent. In political terms, however, this group was one more trump card in Indonesian hands.

FRETILIN and Portugal attempted on several occasions to solve the problem through dialogue. The Indonesian authorities, however, refused to accept any negotiations in which the parties whose leaders had taken refuge in the territory did not take part. At the same time, it prevented them from taking part in negotiations.

Although in August and September some Indonesian forces had penetrated into the territory of Portuguese Timor in the border area, it was in October 1975 that these incursions became more numerous and violent. As they had been unable to obtain Portugal's collusion in legitimizing the military occupation of the territory, the Indonesians attempted to convince world public opinion that it was the Timorese refugees themselves who had reconquered the territory, with the aid of Indonesian volunteers. In order to sustain this fiction, the Indonesian authorities did not hesitate to murder five Australian television journalists on 16 October, in order to suppress films they had made of Indonesian attacks on East Timor which obviously revealed the falsity of the Indonesian version of events.

On 1-3 November the Foreign Ministers of Portugal and Indonesia met in Rome. Both agreed that decolonization of Timor was Portugal's responsibility, and that negotiations should take place between Portugal and the Timorese parties. On returning to Lisbon, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs Major Melo Antunes affirmed that his Indonesian counterpart had guaranteed that his country would not intervene militarily in Timor or subject the country to any sort of pressure...

Shortly thereafter Portugal proposed to the Timorese parties a series of talks, to take place on 15-20 November. All agreed to this, but UDT and APODETI (controlled by Indonesia) were not in agreement with the time or the place — Darwin — which had been proposed. Once again, Indonesian authorities had made it impossible to reach an agreement. On 28 November 1975, FRETILIN, after many attempts at dialogue, unilaterally declared the territory's independence, which was recognized neither by Portugal nor by the United Nations.

When, following the visit of President Gerald Ford to Jakarta, Indonesia invaded East Timor on 7 December, Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with the invading power and presented a complaint to the United Nations. After this, the Portuguese authorities withdrew from the territory. Approximately fifteen days before, on 25 November, the political situation in Portugal (which had undergone a series of crises, especially in the summer of 1975) had developed in a fashion which pointed to the consolidation of the democratie system. In spite of this, however, the United States, Japan, and other democracies failed to support Portugal in its attempts to block the pro-annexation plans of Indonesia.

6. THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CONDEMN THE INVASION. HOWEVER, THE INTERESTS OF MANY COUNTRIES HAVE LED THEM TO SUPPORT THE INVASION IN PRACTICE.

On the day of the invasion, 7 December 1975, the Portuguese government broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia and requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to take a position on the "*act of aggression*" which the Republic of Indonesia had carried out against the territory of Portuguese Timor. Without abandoning its status as Administering Power, Portugal thus requested UN support for the mission of decolonization which it had not been able to carry out singlehanded, and asked the international community, within the norms governing the relations between peoples and nations, to make Indonesia put a stop to its aggression and withdraw its troops in order to make genuine self-determination possible in the territory os East Timor.

On 12 December the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a resolution stating "*Having heard the statements of the representatives of Portugal, as the administering Power, concerning developments in East Timor... (the General Assembly) strongly deplores the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor... calls upon the government of Indonesia to... withdraw without delay its armed forces from the territory, in order to enable the people of the Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence*" and recommnends to the Security Council that it "*take urgent action to protect the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and the inalienable right of its people to self-determination*".

On 22 December 1975 the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution in which it:

"(...) 1. *calls upon all states to respect the territorial integrity of Timor, as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV),*

2. *Calls upon the government of Indonesia to retire without delay all of its forces from the territory;*

3. *Calls upon the government of Portugal as administering Power, to cooperate fully with the United Nations so as to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination (...)*"

In the meantime, on 10 December Indonesia lauched a second attack, this time near Baucau, the second largest city in the territory, where the island's largest airport is located. In disregard of the United Nations resolutions, ten to fifteen thousand more Indonesian soldiers landed in Dili, Liquiça and Maubara on Christmas Day 1975. In April 1976 the number of Indonesian military personnel in East Timor reached thirty-five thousand.

The annexation of the enclave of Oe-Cusse took place on 19 December, and the occupation of Ataúro Island on 29 December 1975.

As UDT and the other parties in the coalition dominated by Indonesia had lost the civil war, on 24 September 1975 their leaders along with approximately three thousand supporters had withdrawn to the border with Indonesian Timor (taking along the 23 Portuguese military officers which UDT had in the meantime arrested). Indonesia, before allowing them to cross the border, demanded that the leaders of these parties (which would then be called MAC, the Anti-Communist Movement) sign a document requesting the intefgration of East Timor with Indonesia.

Shortly after the invasion, Indonesia took the leaders of these parties to Dili. Without wasting time, on 18 December the Indonesian Minster of Foreign Affairs announced in Jakarta that a Provisional Government had been constituted in Dili by Timorese who had signed (in conditions which gave them no other alternative) the request for the integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia.

On 31 May 1976 the creation of an unelected "*Popular Representative Assembly*" made up of certain individuals on the basis of "consensus and consent" was announced. These persons were designated by the occupying forces. In the group's first meeting it unanimously approved a petition to President Suharto to accept the integration of the territory as part of the Republic of Indonesia. Some days later, a delegation made up of all the members of the "*Popular Representative*

Assembly" and of the "*Provisional Government*" handed the petition officially to President Suharto. On 16 July the Indonesian Parliament accepted and the following day the President of the Republic of Indonesia promulgated the decree of integration of Portuguese Timor as the 27th Indonesian province. Only when this farse was concluded did Indonesia release the Portuguese officers and soldiers it had held hostage for nearly a year.

Based on the report of a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council approved on 22 April a second resolution in which it:

"(...) *Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence (...) calls upon the government of Indonesia to withdraw without further delay all its forces from the territory.*"

This resolution was approved by 12 votes in favor, none against, and two abstentions: Japan and United States of America.

After the Government had completed the farse it called "*self-determination*" and even "*independence*" of Portuguese Timor "*through integration with Indonesia*", the General Assembly of the United Nations has discussed the issue on many further occasions. Thus on 1 December 1976, it approved by a substantial majority a resolution in which it:

"*Reaffirmes the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, and the legitimacy of their sttruggle to achieve this right,*

Reaffirms the previous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations.

Strongly deplores the persistent refusal of the government of Indonesia to comply with the abovementioned resolutions;

Rejects the claim that East Timor has been integrated into Indonesia, inasmuch as the people of the territory have not been able to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence".

In spite of these and other UN resolutions, the United States soon considered the integration of East Timor with Indonesia as a *fait accompli*, although it recognized that no act of self-determination had taken place. The legal adviser to the State Departement, Mr. Aldrich, explained American policy to a Congressional sub-committee as follows:

"*We recognize the validity of the sovereign authority of Indonesia in East Timor, just as we recognize the validity of Portuguese sovereignty in the territory prior to 1975. But I think that, in judicial theory, when a people's right to self-determination is generally recog-*

nized — and we do recognize it — this right is not extinguished except by the exercise of an act of self-determination, which I feel did not occur in this case. Therefore I say that in legal terms, the right to self-determination still exists".

Although the United States voted favorably on the first resolution of the Security Council, on ths second it abstained. The United States abstained on the 1975 General Assembly resolution, and all the resolutions approved by the Assembly in subsequent years received a negative vote from the U. S.

On 14 September 1982 the Assistant Secretary of State for Southeast Asian and Pacific Affairs, John Holdridge, manifested to a sub-committee of the U. S. Congress the Reagan administration's approval of the "*service record*" of Indonesia in East Timor, and affirmed that the American government had accepted the annexation of the territory, although it recognized that a valid act of self-determination had not taken place.

A similar position was taken in May 1990 by Donald Camp, of the East Asia Bureau of the State Department, who declared that President Bush was totally in favor of the "*incorporation*" of Timor by Indonesia. Some months later, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and the U. S. wished to appear in the eyes of the world as the champions of the defense of smaller peoples and nations against the ambitions of their more powerful neighbors, the American embassy in Lisbon nonetheless stated once again that the American government accepted the integration of East Timor with Indonesia, although it recognized that no genuine act of self-determination had occurred.

Australia's official position in the United Nations has enolved more slowly. Only since 1978 has it voted on the side of Indonesia against the resolutions approved by the UN General Assembly. In February 1979, when talks with Indonesia on the maritime border between Australia and East Timor were taking place, Australia implicity acknowledged Indonesian sovereignty over the territory. On 18 August 1985, the Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, in order to speed up the negotiations on the oil in the Sea of Timor, took another step in the same direction, declaring in public the official recognition of the integration of East Timor with Indonesia.

Either openly or covertly, other countries — such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Holland and Spain — supplied weapons as well as political and financial support to Indonesia. At the same time, they attempted to conceal these illegal arms sales (which contradict the principles of the United Nations Charter) with a curtain of silence. This conspiracy of silence allowed many governments to cover up their duplicity and the notorious discrepancy between their public support for the right of self-determination and human rights and their actual policies. It is this silence that has relegated the genocide of the people of Timor to obscurity for sixteen years; and it has become the most powerful ally of the Indonesian occupiers in the oppression and massacre of the Timorese.

It was not only the United Nations that failed to recognize the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Other entities such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Parliaments, the ACP-EEC Parity Assembly (including parliamentarians from countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific as well as from the European Economic Community), among others, have defended the right to self-determination of the Timorese people.

Inter-Parliamentary Union, which includes parliamentarians from all over the world representing diverse political tendencies, approved several resolutions on the issue, such as one in 1981 which "*reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence and insistently urges Indonesia to withdraw its troops in order to allow the exercise of this right.*" In late September 1982 Inter-Parliamentary Union approved a Portuguese appeal to governments and parliaments of the world to recognize and reaffirm the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence.

In the conference which took place in Bangkok (Thailand, like Indonesia, is a member of ASEAN) on 7-12 October 1987, Inter-Parliamentary Union approved (by 791 in favor, 22 against and 207 abstentions) a resolution expressing concern about the situation in East Timor and urging the interested parties to work together to find a solution in accord with the principles of self-determination.

On 1 October 1987 the Parity Assembly (ACP-EEC) unanimously approved in Lisbon a resolution in which it:

"1. *Condemns the illegal and illegitimate occupation of East Timor by Indonesia;*

2. *Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence;*

3. *Calls upon the interested parties to find a solution to the problem of East Timor in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter;*

4. *Requests that its co-President transmit the present resolution to the Council of Ministers ACP-EEC, to the governments of the signatory states of the Lome Convention*".

In the European Parliament, the concerted initiatives (since Portugal joined the EEC in January 1986) of the Portuguese parliamentarians, belonging to all parties represented without exception, have led to the approval of numerous important resolutions on the issue, such as those of 19 July 1986, 15 September 1988 and 23 November 1989.

The resolution of July 1986, approved by a large majority (162 votes in favor, 3 against and 4 abstentions), states:

"*A. Considering that since December 1975 Indonesia has occupied by force, in disregard of international law, the territory of East Timor, (the European Parliament)*

1. *calls upon the Government of Indonesia to cease immediately all hostilities against the inhabitants of East Timor, to put a end to the occupation of this territory and respect the right of the Maubere people to self-determination...*"

In the resolution of 15 September 1988 the European Parliament states:

"*Considering that the territory of East Timor was invaded and occupied on 7 December 1975, was illegaly annexed in July 1976, and has been since then subject to forced occupation by Indonesia; that this situation has provoked the genocide of a third of the population, (...) (the European Parliament)*

1. *Condemns the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia and supports the right to self-determination of the people of East Timor;*

2. *Defends the right of the people of East Timor to maintain, develop and affirm its cultural, linguistic, and religious identity, which is the consequence of its own history;*

3. *Condemns the Indonesian policy of denying independent foreign visitors the possibility of freely examining the situation in the territory and of investigating alleged human rights violations (...)*

9. *Urges member states of the European Community to take political initiatives to contribute to the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor, which is an indispensable condition for the respect of fundamental human rights of the population and for the exercise of the right to self-determination including the right to independence, and to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General so that these objectives may be achieved;*

10. *Requests of the UN Secretary-General that, in his efforts to find a solution to the conflict, not only Portugal and Indonesia be heard, but also representatives of the people of East Timor, the Nationalist Convergence;*

11. *Calls upon governments of all Community member states to suspend sales of military equipment to Indonesia until this country puts an end to the illegal occupation of East Timor (...)*

15. *Draws the attention of all EEC institutions to the present colonial situation in East Timor and the terms of the present resolution in the relations that develop in the framework EEC-ASEAN (...)"*

The resolution of 23 November 1989, approved after the papal visit to the territory and the repression which followed it:

"(...) 1. *Reaffirms its demand that the right to self-determination and independence of the people of East Timor be recognized, according to the norms of international law;*

(...) 4. *Condemns, once more, the genocide being carried out by Indonesia in East Timor".*

On 28 June 1991 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (including 25 countries) approved in Helsinki in the meeting of its Standing Committee a resolution which states:

"4. *The Assembly condemns the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, which it regards as a violation of international law and more particularly of peoples' right to self-determination and independence;*

5. *It likewise condemns the continual grave violations of human rights which the Indonesian occupying forces have inflicted on the people of East Timor and it affirms the right of the Timorese people to decide their own political destiny and preserve, develop and assert their cultural, linguistic and religious identity.*

6. *It points out that Portugal, which is the governing power recognized by the United Nations General Assembly, is morally and legally obliged to "promote and guarantee the right of the people of Timor to self-determination and independence (Article 297 of the Portuguese Constitution) and supports Portugal's many representations in this matter since 1975.*

... 8. *The Assembly demands that the Indonesian government:*

i. ends all violation of international instruments establishing human rights and peoples' right to self-determination and independence;

ii. opens East Timor's borders and allows international aid and human rights organizations, starting with the Red Cross, to carry on their work there;

iii. orders an immediate cease-fire with the Timorese resistance forces, withdraws its armed forces from East Timor and creates the politiacal preconditions for free exercise of self-determination.

9. Lastly, the Assembly calls on Council of Europe member states to:

i. insist upon a political solution negotiated within the United Nations and involving Portugal, Indonesia and the East Timorese people;

ii. urge countries which have economic links with Indonesia to bring pressure to bear on Indonesia to halt all violations of human rights and all appropriation of East Timor's natural resources and assets;

iii. support food shipments and health aid to the East Timorese people;

iv. implement an arms embargo to Indonesia until the objectives set out in paragraph 8 have been achieved".

After the Santa Cruz massacre, which took place in Dili on 12 November 1991 and which we shall discuss later in more detail, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Western Europe unanimously approved on 3 December 1991 a resolution, of which the following excerpts are quoted:

"1. The Assembly condemns the massacre which took place on 12 November in East Timor, and the continual violence carried out by the Indonesian occupying forces.

(...) 3. The Assembly, in regard to the Indonesian government's policy of annexation by force (which constitutes the crime of genocide which is continuing and becoming worse), feels that the international community should undertake initiatives promoting conditions allowing the people of East Timor to exercise their right to self-determination and independence (...)

4. Therefore, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Western Europe demands that the Indonesian government;

a) Cease all violence and all violations of international norms demanding respect for the rights of man and the rights of peoples to self-determination and independence;

b) Proceed to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the necessary political conditons for the free exercise of self-determination;

c) Take concrete measures to open East Timor effectively and immediately, and allow international aid organizations and organizations defending human rights, as well as United Nations missions, to carry out their humanitarian activities and evaluate the situation regarding human rights violations.

The Assembly requests of all member states:

i) The immediate embargo of weapons to Indonesia;

ii) The immediate suspension of military agreements with and support of Indonesia (*).

Also on 3 December the Council of Ministers of the twelve EEC (European Economic Community) countries condemned Indonesia's actions in East Timor, suggesting the reassessment of cooperation with this country, "*taking into account the reactions of the Indonesian authorities to the serious concern expressed by the international community*".

In the declaration approved by this Council of Ministers, the European Community demands an "*exhaustive and credible*" investigation of the events of November 1991 in East Timor, to be carried out by "*independent and impartial*" experts. In this statement the ministers of the twelve European countries manifest their support for a just and internationally acceptable solution, respecting the principles of the United Nations Charter and "*taking into account the necessity of defending human rights, the basic freedoms and the complete respect for the legitimate interests and aspirations of the people of the territory.*"

(*) Translated from the Portuguese in the original manuscript.

7. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE INDONESIAN OCCUPATION, MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND TIMORESE HAVE DIED, VICTIMS OF GENOCIDAL POLICIES.

Taking into account the Portuguese census of 1970 and Catholic statistics dating from 1974 which indicated that East Timor had at that time 688,771 inhabitants, in December 1975 the total should have reached nearly 700,000, including the two or three thousand Timorese who had left the territory in 1975 and the one thousand five hundred dead in the civil war between FRETILIN and UDT.

Three years after the invasion, on 25 December 1978, the Indonesian authorities estimated the population of the territory at 498,433 people. And in 1980 the Catholic Church counted only 425,000.

Even allowing for a certain margin of error in these statistics, this means that more tham 200,000 Timorese (nearly a third of the population of the the territory) died in the first five years of Indonesian occupation, as a consequence of the invasion, the war, the murders and arrests (many prisoners were tortured to death), and the hunger caused by the destruction carried out by the Indonesian forces and by the installation of Timorese in concentration camps, without land enough to cultivate.

In a document of joint reflexion elaborated in 1981, the religious of East Timor wrote bitterly, "*We also confess that we still do not understand why the Indonesian Church and the Roman Church have not officially and openly declared their solidarity with the Church, religious, and people of East Timor. Perhaps this is what is hardest for us to bear. Seeing the extent of the tragedy of the people of East Timor, which has lasted six long years, with more than 200,000 victims,* *as is known throughout the world, we are astonished at the silence which would seem to condemn us to die alone*".

In orden to prevent the world from finding out about this genocide, the Indonesian forces did not hesitate to murder foreign journalists who dared to remain in the territory.

The five first victims, belonging to two Australian television crews from Channel 7 in Melbourne and Channel 9 in Sydney, were killed on 16 October 1975. They had been filming the conquest of Balibó, in Portuguese Timor, by Indonesian armed forces coming from Indonesian Timor. At this time the Portuguese authorities still maintained a symbolic presence on the island of Ataúro and FRETILIN, which had won the civil war against UDT, controlled eastern Timor. On attempting an invasion from the land border, the Indonesian government was trying to avoid the recourse to naval and air forces, in order to convince international public opinion that Timorese refugees were attempting to reconquer the territory and that the Indonesians were participating only as volunteers.

The images and statements of the two Australian television crews in East Timor, who had gone to the border when they heard that an Indonesian attack was imminent, revealed this as the farse it really was. For this reason, the journalists Greg Shackleton and Malcolm Rennie, the sound engineer Tony Stewart and the cameramen Jan Cunningham and Brian Peters were killed.

Not far away, in Maliana, the Portuguese journalist Adelino Gomes witnessed the attack which was followed by the murder of the five journalists. The Indonesian officers responsible for this operation (Coronel Dading Kalbourdi and Major Yunus) were promoted shortly thereafter. The official photographer of the operation was decorated by General Suharto.

The Australian government, although it was somewhat disconcerted by the impact of this crime on public opinion, carried out an inconclusive and ambiguous imquiry. Good relations with Jakarta and the oil of the Sea of Timor were more important than the murdered Australian journalists.

At the beginning of December 1975 the signs that Indonesia was about to unleash a large-scale sea and air offensive in the Dili area led the Australian authorities to advise their fellow citizens to leave the territory at once. The Australian journalist Roger East decided to stay in East Timor, even when the members of the International Red Cross mission left for Ataúro on 6 December 1975. President Gerald

Ford had given the green light for the invasion on his visit to Jakarta, which he left on the same day (6 December).

On the following day, 7 December 1975, shortly after the Indonesian invasion, in which hundreds of paratroopers and nearly ten thousand soldiers had landed, Roger East was murdered by the Indonesian invaders, along with more than a hundred Timorese, in the port area of Dili.

For thirteen years, from December 1975 to December 1988, the Indonesian authorities imposed an almost total news blackout over the eastern part of the island of Timor. During these thirteen years, very few foreign journalists were able to enter the territory. Although their visits were extremely brief, authorized only in periods of relative calm, and strictly monitored, the situation they describe is that of a population which has been torn apart by war, hunger, and every sort of atrocity on the part of the invading forces.

The International Red Cross was only allowed to visit East Timor, on a temporary basis and in a very limited fashion, on 24 March 1979. For more than three years, not even the Red Cross was allowed to enter.

In one of its first reports, in 1979, the Red Cross mission states that the humanitarian situation in East Timor is worse than that of the Biafran civil war, and that an urgent campaign of medical aid and food shipments was necessary in order to prevent the death of tens of thousands of Timorese.

The *"Provincial Government of Timor"*'s own statistics cited in a report of a committee of the Australian Senate show that in the four years after the beginning of Indonesian occupation more than 85% of the livestock in East Timor was destroyed.

	1973 (in thousands)	1974 (in thousands)	Percentile reduction
Buffaloes	141	24	83%
Horses	139	15	89%
Pigs	305	27	91%
Sheep and Goats	318	36	88%

Although in late April 1983 the Center for Defense Information in Washington had published an estimate of 100,000 to 250,000 deaths in the Timorese conflict (which made it the second deadliest war being fought at the time, surpassed only in absolute terms by the killing in

Cambodia), for a long time the American administration attempted to minimize these statistics.

At the beginning of 1977 an important Congressional staffer declared that only two thousad Timorese had died in the conflict.

As this number was ridiculously low, shortly thereafter Robert Oakley spoke of ten thousand dead. Obviously, the State Department was aware of Indonesian reports citing far greater numbers, and it also was acquainted with a Catholic report dating from late 1976 indicating nearly a hundred thousand dead. However, in countries where censorship does not exist, public opinion can be manipulated by minimizing events when they happen and only giving them their true dimension when they are part of the past and have thus lost their impact. This tactic has been repeatedly used in regard to the drama of Timor, not only by the United States government, but also by other democratic governments which call themselves defenders of human rights.

While the regime of Pol Pot was killing nearly two and a half million Cambodians (in a population of nearly nine million) in the name of radical Communist-inspired principles, the military regime of General Suharto was responsible for a genocide which was proportionally just as serious —if not even more deadly — eliminating nearly a third of the population of East Timor, in the name of freedom and of Western interests.

As if it were not enough to kill the Timorese, the Indonesian occupiers launched campaigns of forced sterilizations of Timorese women.

At the beginning of 1987 the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the American Congress manifested its concern regarding *"a program of population control imposed on East Timor by the occupying authorities, in spite of the steep drop in the island's population after the Indonesian invasion in 1975"*. Two years later, the "*Governor*" of the territory, appointed by Jakarta, also recognized the fact and deplored its international repercussions.

In addition to physical genocide, the Indonesian authorities have promoted the cultural genocide of the Timorese people.

Traditional animistic cults are banned, and those who practice them are arrested and in some cases murdered. They have attempted to forbid the use of the Portuguese language, as well as of Tetum, the *lingua franca* spoken among the Timorese, and have tried to impose the use of Indonesian Bahasa. Indonesia has attempted to promote the spread of Islam among the Timorese, but has not met with success, because the population has increasingly taken refuge in the Catholic Church. Even worse than the impostion of the language is the way in which Indonesia has promoted the settlement of Timor by Indonesians.

On 28 March 1984, the Portuguese Conference of Bishops, in a note issued by its Permanent Council, stated, *"Regardless of other considerations which could be cited, it is illusory to think that behind the sad events which have occurred in Timor there does not exist the awareness of a national entity which cannot be suppressed or destroyed. Timor aspires to the full expression of its own individuality, and to prevent this will result in not only physical but in cultural genocide. The latter is even more serious than the former, for it affects not only the dead but also the survivors, and nor only the present generations but also those of the future."*

8. IN SPITE OF THEIR COMPLETE ISOLATION, THE MAUBERE PEOPLE RESIST INDONESIAN OCCUPATION.

When the Indonesian generals decided to invade and annex Timor, they thought that a few days would suffice to have the territory and its population entirely under control. The difference in power between the fifth most populous nation in the world and the small and underdeveloped people of East Timor was immense. In addition, Timor is an island territory, without foreign military assistance and without a neighboring country that could offer sanctuary to resistance fighters. For these reasons, and due to the relative ethnic and population similarities between the two parts of Timor, many politicians believed that integration would be easy and resistance would quickly weaken or be eliminated entirely.

After sixteen years of horror, one is forced to reach a different conclusion. Resistance to integration continues, is more generalized in character, and is far more deeply entrenched among the Timorese today than at the time of invasion.

There are two main reasons for this surprising capacity for resistance:

— On the one hand, the enormous cultural differences which, as we have seen, separate Timorese and Javanese;

— On the other hand, the brutal behavior of the Indonesian forces, which rather than obtaining submission through terror, provoked deep and generalized sentiments of revolt.

The atrocities committed by Indonesian troops created a widespread and profound feeling of horror among the population. As a result, the factors dividing the Timorese, whether ethnic, cultural or even political in nature, have faded away, and national sentiment has become increasingly strong and generalized. If, in the beginning, only certain sectors of the Timorese resistance call themselves Mauberes, nowadays most of the population use this designation with pride. It is the symbol of national resistance to the Indonesian occupation of their homeland.

In the first phase of the war, from December 1975 to August 1977, most of the population took refuge in the mountains, under the protection of the FRETILIN forces. FRETILIN'S fighting forces, known as FALINTIL, carried on a classical sort of warfare against the invaders.

When Indonesia received American Bronco OV 10 warplanes and later British Hawks, it was able to raze extensive areas and carry out search and destroy operations which eliminated most of the FALINTIL and a significant part of the population. In this second phase of the war, from 1977-1978, the second President of FRETILIN, Nicolau Lobato, died in combat on 31 December 1978. (The first President, Xavier do Amaral, had in the meantime surrendered.) Until 1981 the Indonesian forces continued persecuting small Resistance groups and the segments of the population which had not yet been sent to concentration camps.

In spite of promises of amnesty, the behavior of the Indonesian forces was so brutal, and the way they treated those who surrendered was so barbaric, that after 1981 the Resistance rose from its own ashes, under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão.

Indonesia, displeased by this rebirth of the Resistance, did not hesitate to mobilize many thousands of unarmed Timorese civilians, whom it forced to march in front of Indonesian troops in order to act as human shields in the fight against the Resistance. Peace talks on 23 March 1983 marked the end of this third phase of the war. In Lari-Gutu the Commander of Indonesian forces in Timor, Colonel Purwanto, and the leader of the Resistance, Xanana Gusmão, established a cease-fire.

From March to August 1983, in the fourth phase of the war, the cease-fire was respected. Timorese nationalists proposed a Peace Plan including "*the free and democratic consultation of the Maubere peoples*", after a transition period.

On 10 May 1983, the President of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance, the Commander in Chief of FALINTIL Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, issued a clarifying statement:

"*FRETILIN declares that the Maubere people are aware of the fact that they are part of Southeast Asia. Therefore, FRETILIN declares that it does not wish now or in the future to be a source of conflict* *in the region. East Timor will be a non-aligned country and will follow a policy of peaceful coexistence. These principles will be the basis of its relations with other countries, and technical, economic and cultural links to its neighbors will be reinforced. The Maubere people are aware that they must respect the interests of their neighbors and believe as well that their own legitimate interests will be respected in return."*

An addendum to this Peace Plan stated that:

"I. Portugal, represented by a High Commissioner, would be present as decolonizing power:

II. A government of national unity would be formed during the period of transition, with the participation of a Portuguese High Commissioner, until the first general elections."

Unfortunately, Indonesian counter-intelligence managed to characterize these peace talks as a surrender on the part of FRETILIN, and the chance to achieve a just peace and a lasting solution in accordance with international law was lost.

During the cease-fire there were "friendly" contacts between the occupiers and the Resistance, which led the former to believe that they had learned a great deal about the structure and tactics of the guerrilla forces.

Instead of taking the Peace Plan presented by the Maubere Resistance into account, in August 1983 General Benny Murdani publicly threatened, "*If the FRETILIN guerrilla fighters do not accept the East Timorese government's offer of amnesty, the Government will deal them a crushing blow*". He added, "*This time there will be no more playing around, no mercy... I cannot allow national unity to be destroyed... The armed forces will use all available means in a cleanup operation to get rid of what is left of the FRETILIN rebels.*"

The general kept his promise. On 17 August (Indonesian Independence Day) an extremely violent military action began. In a curious contrast with this situation of open warfare, in which Indonesia used tens of thousands of soldiers and every sort of weapon at its disposal to crush the Resistance, slaughtering the entire population of the village of Kraras and committing extensive violations of human rights, the Indonesian representative, in his speech to the United Nation Committee on Decolonization, described the situation in East Timor as follows:

"*The province is at peace. The wounds of the civil war started by FRETILIN and the Portuguese have been cured. The entire population is involved in the economic, social and cultural development of the province as part of the Indonesian republic.*" (*)

(*) Translated from the Portuguese in the original manuscriot.

Taking into account the immense amount of weaponry and firepower used against the Maubere Resitance, General Benny Murdani predicted that the rebellion would be crushed by 5 October 1983 (Indonesian Armed Forces Day), and promised to present important Timorese war trophies at that time. He was in all likelihood planning to present the Commander in Chief of the FALINTIL, Xanana Gusmão, dead or alive, as well as other guerrillla leaders. This promise was not kept by the Indonesian Commander in Chief. Not only was he unable to capture any FRETILIN leader, but also he had to postpone on successive occasions the date of the end of the state of exception in East Timor. In mid-October 1983, the "*Governor*" of the territory, Mário Carrascalão, was more prudent, though he still declared, *"I think it will all be over in a matter of months. I think that in a few months the situation in East Timor will be back to normal.*" In January 1984 Jakarta still was predicting the end of the operations in the following month.

But years passed and the large-scale operations, involving crack Indonesian troops, including the forces under the command of Colonel Prabowo, son-in-law of President Suharto, continued unsuccessfully. In some cases, for example in 1985, the Timorense civil population was once again mobilized to act as human shields for the Indonesian troops. The guerrilla struggle spread once again to nearly the entire territory, altought actions were infrequent in order to minimize casualties and prolong resistance.

From August 1983 to Sptember 1989, resistance to the occupation went through a fifth phase, in which the sense of national unity was strengthened and an underground network carried on the struggle in towns and cities.

Corresponding to the unity achieved in the interior of the territory, where members of UDT, APODETI and of other parties which had supported integration also participated in the Resistance, the leaders of FRETILIN and UDT beyond the borders of Timor signed on 18 March 1986 a mutual cooperation agreement in which they create a joint entity called Timorese National Convergence, and declare their support for "*the installation of a Western-style democracy in East Timor*". In addition, the two Timorese political organizations manifest their wish to cooperate "*so that the issue of East Timor can be placed in a suitable context on the international scene. This will in turn draw attention to what is fundamentally at stake: the defense of international law and of the principles contained in the United Nations Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*"

In accordance with these positions, FALINTIL was no longer considered the armed forces of FRETILIN and was thereafter considered the Armed Forces of National Libertation of East Timor, as its leader declared in a message dated 7 December 1987:

"FALINTIL has only one supreme mission to carry out: to defend our homeland and maintain internal order, as established in a Constitution in which individual and collective rights are protected and the interests of citizens from all walks of life are respected. For the glorious FALINTIL to fulfill its mission within a governmental framework, whatever its political character may be, it is fundamental to affirm from this moment on the neutrality of the Armed Forces of National Libertation of East Timor."

In a letter dated 31 December 1988, Commander in Chief Xanana Gusmão resigned from FRETILIN, in order to ensure the nonpartisan character of the Armed Forces of National Liberation. On 5 October 1989 Xanana Gusmão clarifed his position:

"The FALINTIL have taken on, in these last eleven years, their true role, that is, of defending our homeland, without links to any political party whatsoever.

... the FALINTIL are not involved in politics, but they are committed to building a free and democratic nation, based on respect for the freedoms of thought, association and expression, as well as complete respect for Universal Human Rights.

A multi-party system and a market economy will be foundations of an independent East Timor (which the freedom fighters are building with their corpses). It will be a free and nonaligned state with the firm purpose of becoming a member of ASEAN, in order to contribute to regional stability."

At the same time, the struggle was being organized in the cities and regions controlled by Indonesia. Underground networks were created which managed to outwit the news blackout imposed on the island of Timor, and the first demonstrations began to take place. In some cases they consisted simply of raising the FRETILIN banner or the Portuguese flag (as occurred in Dili on Christmas Eve 1987). On other occasions pamphlets were distributed clandestinely, like those which on 11 November 1987 appeared in the Government House, Military Headquarters and the Provincial Parliment, as well as in other public buildings and diverse areas of Dili. In these pamphlets, one could read, "*Indonesian dogs, out of Timor! We want the return of the Portuguese to ensure self-determination and independence for our homeland, East*

Timor." Shortly thereafter, some Timorese priests and a Portuguese missionary were interrogated by the Indonesian Secret Service and subjected to strong pressure and threats.

When Timorese students were sent with scholarships to the Indonesian universities of Jakarta and Yogyakarta, in Java, to that of Dempsar, in Bali, and others, the underground network spread to the heart of Indonesia. And in spite of the betrayals which landed some Timorese students in prison and caused in cartain cases, the "accidental" death of others — as was the case of the recently graduated economist José António Moniz da Silva on 15 December 1987 — the struggle of the Maubere people became known to Indonesian students.

The visit of Pope John Paul II to Timor on October 12, 1989 marked the beginning of what we can call the sixth phase of Resistance. Timorense young people, educated within the Indonesian university, demonstrated against the occupation, and Indonesian students also became aware of the problem. The first student demonstration, in which the young people shouted their desire for independence, occured at the end of the mass celebrated by the Pope in Taci-Tolu, in the suburbs of Dili.

Francesc Valls, of the Madrid daily newspaper *El País*, was one of the journalists who witnessed the events. Here are two paragraphs from his report:

"The extreme care with which the Indonesian government had prepared the papal visit to Dili, capital of East Timor, turned out to have been in vain, due to a demonstration against the annexation of this former Portuguese colony by Indonesia, which has occupied it since 1975. Shouts in favor of a independent East Timor echoed in Portuguese and Tetum when John Paul II concluded, with the words 'ite missa est' the eucharistic celebration of what was expected to be the most polemical stage of the Pope's journey to Southeast Asia."

The Spanish journalist continues,

"... In the meantime, the cries in favor of the independence of Timor increased. The security forces from then on treated journalists more roughly. They took cameras from two of them and destroyed their film. The demonstrators, in a cloud of dust, defended themselves by throwing chairs and rocks at the police."

On 15 January 1990, nearly 400 young Timorese took advantage of the visit to Dili by the ambassssador of the United Stated of America to Jakarta to demonstrate near the hotel where he was staying. In the posters they were carrying one could read in English, "*Independence* *or Death*", "*Integration, No and Never*", "*Indonesians, Out of Our Country*". The Indonesian forces burst into the hotel gardens. The confrontations attracted the ambassador's attention, and he came to the door and began to talk to the demonstrators. They apologized for disturbing him and told him they merely wanted to let him know about human rights violations in Timor and to appeal to the United Nations to intervene in the territory. The dialogue between the demonstrators and Ambassador John Monjo lasted nearly an hour.

As the ambassador's car was leaving, the occupation forces charged against the demonstrators. Many were hurt and/or arrested. The ambassador himself was shocked at the violence with which such a peaceful demonstration was repressed.

After these demonstrations the Indonesian military authorities created death squads, which began to act in late January 1990. In Dili, four corpses appeared which could not be identified due to the mutilations they had suffered.

Also in January 1990, the *Newpaper of National Resistance of the Students of East Timor, (Neon Metin)* reappeared with new vigor. This underground newspaper, nationalist and non-partisan in character, had first appeared in 1989, but Indonesian repression had caused it to become silent.

On 7 September 1989, nearly a hundred Timorese university students studying in Indonesia had signed a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, in which they requested:

"*— The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Indonesian forces, all the bureaucratic apparatus, and all the immigrants who have taken advantage of the coercive structures of the Jakarta government in the illegal occupation of our homeland, in the appropriation of our property, in the exploitation of our resources and in the extermination of our people:*

— An immediate referendum:

— The participation of the legitimate representatives of the people of East Timor, namely National Convergence (UDT - FRETILIN) in all international forums where solutions to the problem of East Timor are discussed."

The students also supported:

"*... the position stated by Mons. Ximenes Belo, Bishop of Dili, in his letter of 6 February 1989 to the UN Secretary General*" in which a referendum is proposed, and manifest their "*appreciation for the solidarity demonstrated by international organizations (governmental and non-governmental).*"

The letter ends with the affirmation that "*self-determination and independence are necessary to achieve the interests of the Timorese people.*"

On 26 December 1989, Timorese students on the Indonesian island of Bali demonstrated against the repression affecting their fellow-students in Dili. The demonstration was violently repressed, and days later one of the Timorese students, José Carvalho, was found dead at Seliwang Creek, Bogor.

Situations like this one caused Indonesian students to break their silence. On 31 January 1990 Ammarsyah, a student at Bandung Techological Institute, was on trial. He had been arrested, together with five other students, for having organized a pro-democracy demonstration on the occasion of the Interior Minister Rudini's visit to the Institute on August 5, 1989. He decided to use the court case to make his ideas on the situation in Timor and Indonesia public in a speech titled "Indonesia, a story of bayonets and iron helmets". In this speech, after alluding to numerous human rights violations in his own country, the Indonesian student declared to the court:

"*Your Honor, let us focus on the slaughter which took place in East Timor:* Citing reports from Amnesty International and the International Red Cross, he described the massacres of entire villages and the death of a third of the Timorese population, the deportations, the arbitrary arrests whithout trial, and the '*disappearances*' of prisoners. "*It is a public secret,*" said Ammarsyah, "*that offices of the regional administration and local military posts were used to interrogate and torture prisoners.*" Concluding the part of his speech related to East Timor, he read Mons. Ximenes Belo's letter from Dili, dated 6 February 1989, in which the latter asks the UN Secretary-General "*to start the most normal and democratic process of decolonization: a referendum.*" As the Indonesian student stated in court, this letter "*raises the issue of the decolonization of East Timor once again.*"

Another similar example is the report of the Rural Development Research Department of the prestigious Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta (Java). This 130-page report was based on a study carried out at the beginning of 1990. Its conclusions were to be the focal point of a seminar in Dili on 19 April 1990, under the sponsorship of the Central Bank of Indonesia and the Office for Planning and Development of East Timor. However, due to the report's contents and conclusions, the seminar was suddenly cancelled "*for technical reasons*", according to the Indonesian Ministry of Defense.

According to this report, "*although the Indonesian government feels that integration has resolved the problem of decolonization, the Timorese do not feel the same*". It goes on, "*The apathy and indifference of the population regarding the programs show not only the inexistence of mutual adaptation between us and the Timorese, but also — especially — prove that the rejection of our presence is growing and developing in a natural way.*"

The team which carried out this research in East Timor in the first months of 1990, led by Professor Mobyarto, had been in the territory in 1981 and 1989. Therefore it was possible for them to make comparisons and observe the evolution of the situation. As these Indonesian university researchers state in their report, Timorese society has been traumatized by the continuing situation of war, and "*even among the Timorese elite there is a feeling of hatred (toward the Indonesian Armed Forces). Thus one of the main suggestions of the report is that steps be taken to put an end to the war.*"

Here is another of their suggestions:

"*Taking into consideration the close ties linking the Timorese and their birthplace and customs, the program re-installing families should be canceled. The population of strategic villages should be allowed to return to their native villages, in order to cultivate their own land and live in accord with their own customs.*" (p. 129)

On the subject of the Timorese Church, the Indonesian university report affirms, "*Competition between the Catholic Church and the Indonesian governmet is at the heart of the problem. The Church has an important resouce, the support of the masses, but it has no material resources; the Government has abundant resources and coercive means but lacks popular support.*" (p. 9)

Shortly ather an extremely violent speech by the Indonesian Defense Ministry in Dili on 3 February 1990 in which he completely contradicted the suggestions of the abovementioned report, thousands of Indonesian troop reinforcements arrived in East Timor. Their goal, once again, was to capture the leader of the Maubere Resistance, Xanana Gusmão, and to end resistance once and for all. Massacres once again took place (this time in villages of the Ainaro and Bobnaro areas, like Lour). Prisons once again were full: prisoners were tortured and women were raped. A forced curfew was imposed in Dili and other cities. Disappearances continued. The Resistance defended itself and counter-attacked.

On 17 July 1990 (the anniversary of "*integration*" with Indonesia) students from the Colmera and Becora schools in Dili and other places raised the FRETILIN flag. In spite of the intervention of occupying forces, the students refused to take down their flag until the Indonesian flag was taken down as well.

The most surprising thing about this tenacious resistance is the role played by Timorese children in recent months. They go up to Indonesian soldiers in the streets and ask, before they run away, "*Kapan pulang?*" which means, "*When are you going to leave?*"

For all these reasons, in September 1990 the Resistance leader, Xanana Gusmão, in an interview given to an Australian journalist, remarked with confidence, *":... if three or four years ago we were worried about what would happen after the extermination of the FALINTIL, now we see it as the price we had to pay for our homeland. It is not only with pleasure but with great pride that the FALINTIL observe that their sacrifice to foster and consolidate the bases for a genuinely national resistance have been worthwhile.*

The internal situation has reached an extraordinary state, and we cannot hide our immense satisfaction on affirming this. Our original hopes have come true. This new state of things, built on the bodies of all those who have died for our homeland, and the confidence we feel in the total abnegation of our people has became the certainty and faith that has always guided us. It is our absolute duty to seek victory.

Regarding the war, in general terms, time is on our side and not on Jakarta's. The FALINTIL know that we have fulfilled our duty and that we are politically, psychologically, and morally prepared to face even our own slaughter, because we know that this will not mean the end of the war. The Maubere people will go on fighting and will never give up, regardless of what the winds of history have in store for us."

9. THE OIL OF THE SEA OF TIMOR STILL INFLUENCES THE BEHAVIOR OF AUSTRALIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

In 1971-72 an agreement fixing the borders between Australia and Indonesia was concluded. The Timor Gap, that is, the border between Australia and Portuguese Timor in the area corresponding to this territory, had been the object of talks between Portugal and Australia since 1971.

It had been known for quite some time that the region was rich in oil, and in 1975 the Canberra government was not satisfied with the results obtained in the talks with Portugal. This was the reason for the opinion of the Australian ambassador to Jakarta that it would be easier to negotiate the border with Indonesia and that it would thus be advantageous to support the integration of East Timor with the neighboring country, as we have already said.

On 11 December 1989, the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty was finally signed. Three areas are defined in the disputed zone:

Area A is to be controlled jointly by the two states, and profits are to be shared equally. This area has the coveted (though geologically unknown) "*kelp*" structure, and is estimated to contain several million barrels of oil.

Area B is to be controlled by Australia, and Indonesia is to receive 10% of brute income.

Area C is to be under Indonesian administration, and Australia will receive 10% of income.


EAST TIMOR
INDONESIA
Simplified Line of Bathymetric Axis
Area C
Seabed
Boundary
Simplified Line of 1500m Isobath
Area A
Simplified Equidistant Line
Simplified Equidistant Line
Agreed
Median
Line
Area B
200 naut miles from Indonesia
Darwin
AUSTRALIA
Western Australia
Northern Territory

The authorities responsible for the area are, according to this treaty, a Ministerial Council, with an equal number of ministers from each government, and a joint authority.

Portugal, as administering Power, presented on 31 October 1988 a formal protest against this agreement. When it was confirmed by both governments in February 1991, Portugal presented a complaint in the International Court of Justice of the Hague (22/2/1991) to defend the interests of the Timorese.

In its argument, Portugal states that the agreement established between Australia and Indonesia violates international law, is lacking in respect for the resolutions approved by the UN General Assembly and Security Council, and totally disregards the legitimate interests of the people of East Timor, that is, of a non-autonomous territory under Portuguese administration.

In spite of Portugal's protests and the complaint to the International Court of Justice, Australia and Indonesia continued with their plans to extract the oil of the Timor Gap, one of the twenty richest oil deposits in the world.

Even after the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 1991, twelve oil companies manifested their interest in participating in this undertaking. According to press reports, (*Público*, 12 December 1991), they were as follows:

Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands, U. K.)
Chevron Co. (U. S. A.)
BHP (Broken Hill Pty Co. Ltd., Australian). This company was already extracting nearly 100,000 barrels of oil a day in the Timor Gap area in December 1990.
Woodside Petroleum (linked to BHP)
Santos Ltd. (Australia)
Nippon Oil (Japan)
Philips Petroleum (U. S.)
Marathon Oil Co (U. S.)
Sagasco (Australia)
Petroz NL (Australia)
Entreprise Oil PLC (U. K.)
Western Mining (Australia)

Shortly thereafter eleven research contracts were signed, and on 9 January 1992 four of these companies were authorized to begin exploration.

When one observes the alacrity with which the governments of Australia, Japan and the United States of America accepted the results of the report of the Comission of Inquiry into the 12 November massacre in Dili, one cannot help noticing the convergence between the interests of the oil lobby and support for the Indonesian government and its policy of occupying East Timor.

In view of the fact that the United States and Australia intervened militarily in Kuwait, with considerable financial support from Japan, in order to expel the Iraqi invaders who had annexed this Gulf state by force, one can observe what international law, justice and peace really mean to the governments of these countries, when their own economic interests are at stake.

10. FEAR ON THE PART OF THE INDONESIAN GENERALS MAKES THE VISIT OF A PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION (SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 1991) IMPOSSIBLE

Resolution nº 37/30, dated 23/11/1982, of the UN General Assembly, "*requests the Secretary-General to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem*".

Portugal was co-sponsor of this Resolution, which Indonesia opposed, voting against it and initially refusing to participate in any negotiations. After 1984, however, talks between Portugal and Indonesia began under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General.

In the first years of the talks it was possible to take certain humanitarian measures, including the authotization to leave Timor for persons with relatives in Portugal and Australia, who had previously not been allowed to leave.

In a second phase, when the talks had fallen into an impasse due to Indonesian intransigence in refusing a genuine act of self-determination, the possibility of the visit of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation was suggested in order to observe at first hand the situation existing in the territory.

While talks continued on the framework, characteristics and dates of such a visit, the General Assembly postponed the debate on East Timor, and no new resolutions on the issue were approved.

The possibility of a visit by a Portuguese parliamentary mission to East Timor was greeted with enormous enthusiasm and expectation by the population of the territory, which had been isolated from the exterior so many years.

On 29/12/1988 Indonesia declared that the territory of East Timor was as open as any other Indonesian province. In spite of the practical difficulties which still existed (especially in periods of greater repression) some tourists and even journalists began to visit the territory. Other journalists and many human rights organizations were still prevented from entering, however, and censorship of correspondence, monitoring of telephone calls and strong restrictions of the entry and exits of Portuguese in general and Timorese in particular continued.

Indonesia intended to turn the visit of the Portuguese parliamentarians, accompanied by international journalists, into a propaganda session designed to show off the economic progress promoted by the occupiers. It thus proposed a program of visits to construction projects (bridges, hospitals, schools, etc.) and to administrative authorities linked to the occupying forces.

Most of the Timorese population wished to greet the Portuguese parliamentry delegation and to manifest their wish that Portugal return in order to carry out a genuine process of self-determination. Portugal, as it did not wish to disappoint Timorese hopes, gave in to many Indonesian demands, regarding the conditions of the visit, the program, transportation and security of the delegation (to be the responsibility of Indonesia and not the UN, as would be normal in this case).

While the talks continued in New York, under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General, the occupying forces attempted to "*clean up the terrain*". Many Timorese were arrested and tortured. Some "*disappeared*". In interviews and letters sent abroad, Mons. Ximenes Belo, Apostolic Administrator of the diocesis of Dili, described the climate of terror in the months preceding the planned visit.

In a letter dated 7 September 1991 to a Portuguese priest Mons. Ximenes Belo states:

"*Houses are searched at night. All the cities are full of Intel (agents of the Indonesian Secret Services). The Portuguese won't be able to contact the Timorese, because the latter are being threatened and pressured... With the coming visit of the Portuguese Parliamentary Delegation the Bapaks (Indonesians) are once again carrying out terror campaigns and threats. Whoever approaches the Portuguese will be eliminated*".

In order to reinforce these death threats against the Timorese who might try to demonstrate or contact the Portuguese parliamentary delegation, the occupiers opened mass graves to bury those who refused to fly the Indonesian flag from their homes and those who attempted to contact the delegation, show appreciation for the visit, or manifest their repudiation of the occupation in any other way.

In an apparent goodwill gesture, Indonesia allowed two Portuguese journalists to go to East Timor. One, from Radiopress (Nuno Castro Ferreira) stayed only four days in the territory. But the other, Mário Robalo of *Expresso*, who reached Dili on 30 July, stayed in East Timor for more than three weeks, and was thus able to establish closer contacts with the Timorese and thus confirm the climate of terror imposed by the occupying forces. On the night of 10 August 1991 (exactly sixteen years after the UDT coup) he met in secret with Xanana Gusmão, the leader of the Resistance. It was the first time that a Portuguese journalist had personally contacted the head of the Timorese Resistance, and a long interview took place. Indonesian espionage learned of this meeting, and concluded that in spite of numerous arrests and frequent torture, in spite of the constant campaigns of terror, the underground Resistence networks were still active enough to make such an important meeting possible. This may have been a determining factor in the decision of the Indonesian generals to prevent the visit of the parliamentary delegation, which President Suharto and the Foreign Minister seemed to wish would actually take place. The journalist Mário Robalo, after being interrogated, searched and threatened by the occupation authorities, managed to return to Portugal safe and sound.

In the meantime, a date for the parliamentary visit was finally set. It was to have begun on 4 November 1991.

With the objective of "*gathering firsthand information about the situation in the territory*", the mission was to be made up of representatives of the UN Secretary-General, thirteen Portuguese Members of Parliament accompanied by a supporting staff of thirteen (interpreters, a doctor, etc.), ten Portuguese journalists freely chosen by Portugal, ten Indonesian journalists indicated by the Indonesian government, and twelve international journalists (six to be chosen by Indonesia and the other six by Portugal). The visit of the parliamentary delegation was to last ten to twelve days.

A small preparatory mission, consisting of three UN technicians, two Portuguese diplomats and two Indonesian diplomats, went to Timor in early October to deal with logistic issues and prepare for the visit.

In spite of the climate of terror imposed by the occupiers, it was increasingly clear that the Timorese would demonstrate against occupation and in favor of the return of Portugal to decolonize the territory. The Indonesian generals feared that the visit, to be filmed and to be observed by journalists representing the international press, would become a revelation of their crimes. Therefore, they forced the Indonesian government to find a pretext to make the visit impossible by vetoing three journalists: two Portuguese (Mário Robalo, of *Expresso*, and Rui Araújo, of the Portuguese Television Network) and an Australian, Jill Joliffe.

Faced with this last-minute Indonesian veto, which violated the agreements established in New York, the President of the Portuguese Parliament (Assembly of the Republic) declared on 26/10/1991 that if Indonesia maintained its veto against any of the journalists indicated by Portugal, the visit would not take place. In order to appear less responsible for the impasse, Indonesia backed down, agreeing to allow the presence of the Portuguese journalists who had been vetoed, but maintaining its refusal to allow the entry of the Australian journalist. In spite of protests from the Portuguese and from the International Federation of Journalists, the Indonasian veto was not lifted and the visit of the Parliamentary delegation was indefinitely postponed.

In the meantime, given the climate of terror prevailing in Timor, the bishop Mons. Ximenes Belo, in a letter to the President of Portugal in October 1991, stated that "*the visit will be helpful to people of East Timor only if it is followed up by the presence of UN observers*" (in order to guarantee the lives and personal safety of those who approached the Delegation). As the presence of these observers was uncertain, the Bishop advised the Portuguese parliamentarians not to come, as he feared a bloodbath after their departure from the territory.

In a letter to the UN Secretary-General dated 10 October, of which a copy was sent to President Mário Soares and other world leaders, the leaders of three small Timorese parties who had approved the integration of the territory with Indonesia warned that, due to the climate of "*threats, intimidation and terror on the part of the Indonesians, the visit will mean not the dawn of freedom but the end of the Timorese people*" if it were not accompanied by a force which could ensure the safety of the populations after the departure of the Portuguese delegation. *"Indonesia is in this moment trying desperately not to fall into the humiliation of having to leave East Timor, as the Timorese people so deeply wish"*.

The most curious thing about this letter is that it is signed by Paulo Freitas da Silva, President of the Labor Party; Francisco Dias Ximenes, leader of KOTA; and Abel Belo, former leader of APODETI; that is to say, by the leaders of the three Timorese parties that, along with UDT, made up MAC (the Anti-Communist Movement) that authorized the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

On 28 October, in an interview to journalists from several countries, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, admitted that the United States and Austalia had advised his country not to accept the visit of the Portuguese parliamentary delegation to East Timor, probably because they feared demonstrations on the part of the Timorese and the international denunciation of the criminal Indonesian occupation which would no doubt follow.

The terror which for so many months had been spread by the occupation authorities, the arrests of young Timorese suspects, (they were submitted to electric shocks in sensitive areas, slashed by razors, subjected to every sort of indignity; some were tortured to death and others "*disappeared*") were not enough to ensure that there would be no demonstrations against the Indonesian occupiers. After more than three years of careful preparation, the Indonesian generals feared that the visit would show to the world in general not only the economic development promoted by the occupiers but especially the generalized and deeply felt repudiation of the occupation. They thus found an excuse to make the visit impossible.

11. THE MASSACRE IN THE CEMETERY OF SANTA CRUZ ON 12 NOVEMBER 1991 REVEALS THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES AND, ONCE AGAIN, THE COMPLICITY OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES.

The news that the Portuguese parliamentary delegation would not be able to go to Timor caused great consternation among the Timorese population, which had great hopes of this visit.

Among the Indonesian military leaders, a feeling of relief was mixed with one of humiliation at not having been able to stage a performance showing the acceptance of the status quo by the Timorese. In order to gain revenge for this humiliation and to avenge the uselessness of thousands of meetings throughout East Timor in which the Indonesian military personnel had attempted to instruct the population about how they should behave during the visit and had threatened them with death if they did not follow these instructions carefully, the Indonesian forces in Timor began to behave in a most threatening and provocatory fashion.

For the first time in sixteen years, it was in a church that a young Timorese was killed. Many young people who had been threatened with death by the Indonesian forces took refuge in the Church of St. António de Motael on the night of 27 October 1991. The bells were tolled, in the hope that the soldiers surrounding the church might be induced to contain their violent intincts in front of so many witnesses. But the Indonesian troops did not hesitate to enter the church and shoot the eigtheen-year-old student Sebastião Gomes Rangel. Accidentally a second Timorese was killed, by the name of Afonso Henriques, aged 29. Several dozen young people were arrested. In the following days other churches in Timor were attacked, and many houses were searched, not only in Dili but also in other areas such as Lospalos, Viqueque, Fatumaca and Manatuto, and many Timorese, especially young people, were arrested and tortured. In the raids, houses were searched and people were beaten, to the point that many had broken bones or vomited blood. At times the Indonesian soldiers even stole rosaries.

Two weeks later, after a memorial mass for the soul of Sebastião Gomes, thousands of Timorese went to the cemetery to pay him their last homage. On the road other Timorese joined the cortege: young people, women, elderly people, children. Little by little, flags and posters of the Resistence began to appear. Several journalists who had gone to East Timor, almost all disguised as tourists so that the Indonesian authorities would not prevent them from entering, were in Dili at the time. The young Timorese wanted to take advantage of their presence in order to demonstrate in a peaceful fashion their desire to be free of Indonesian occupation and to achieve self-determination. Shortly after they reached the Cemetery of Santa Cruz, trucks loaded with Indonesian soldiers arrived. In a calm and disciplined form, they lined up, with their weapons at the ready.

Two American journalists, Alan Nairn (*The New Yorker*) and Amy Goodman (of Radio WBAI in New York), fearing the worst, stood between the crowd and the Indonesian soldiers, showing their cameras and tape recorders in the hope that the presence of foreign journalists might dissuade them from violence. They were wrong. Obeying orders from their commader, the soldiers began to fire upon the crowd. The two journalists, along with other journalists who were present, bear witness to the fact that there had been no violent attitudes from the demonstrators, who were totally unarmed. There was no order to disperse nor any warning from the Indonesian soldiers. For some minutes M16 machine guns sprayed the defenseless crowd. After reloading, firing began once again. Many Timorese fled, or hid behind the tombstones. Others had no time to do so and were wounded or killed. The American journalists were mistreated in barbaric fashion. They were probably saved due to the fact that they shouted that they were Americans. Other journalists were arrested and beaten, and their films and manuscripts confiscated.

After the massacre, the Indonesian soldiers cleaned the terrain quickly. Corpses were loaded in trucks and taken to mass graves. Others, still wounded, were shot or bayoneted. Other wounded persons were taken to the hospital, from which they were sent to prison… or to mass graves.

The names of the dead, wounded and arrested were not communicated to their families. Prevented from seeing the corpses in order to identify them, prevented from giving children Christian burials, prevented from visiting the wounded in the hospital or those arrested in prison, Timorese families lived in anguish and doubt. Even the International Red Cross was prevented for fifteen days from visiting the hospital because the wounded had to be interrogated first.

Several witnesses speak of one hundred dead, most of whom were taken in Indonesian Army trucks to mass graves. In spite of the speed with which the Indonesian Army cleaned up the terrain, when the Italian priest Stefani Renato passed by the place three hours later, he still saw a great deal of blood on the street in front of the Cemetery and in the surrounding areas.

According to the Australian journalist Anthony Balmain, three days later, on 15 November, nearly sixty-eight prisoners were taken in four Army trucks to Bé-Musi, near Dili, where they were shot.

Ten witnesses of this second massacre were killed two days later. And as there were witnesses of the third wave of murders, on 18 November seven more persons were killed, including a four-year-old child and a one-year-old baby.

It is probable that two hundred or more Timorese died in the massacre in the cemetery and in subsequent actions. Most of the dead were students under twenty years of age, educated under the Indonesian occupation. A young New Zealander of Malay origin, Kamal Bamadhaj, a senior student at New South Wales University in Australia, died with them. Nearly all the Timorese who were arrested underwent severe torture.

On the day after the massacre, General Try Sutrismo, Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), in a meeting of Lemhanas Graduates (of the National Defense Institute) justified the massacre saying:

"They are people who must be crushed. This scum must be eliminated... come what may, they cannot ignore ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces)... ABRI is determined to eliminate anyone who creates disturbances".

Three Indonesian human rights organizations nonetheless manifested their deep concern. Their leaders were ordered to appear before the police for interrogation, and their activities were suspended.

In addition, a group of Timorese living in Jakarta organized a demonstration on 19 November in front of the UN Information Center.

Many Indonesians supported them, but the demosntration was dispersed and approximately thirty-five Timorese students were arrested and in many cases tortured.

Thousands of Indonesian students, manifesting their shock and disgust at the Dili massacre and showing their solidarity with the Timorese, demonstrated in several universities.

The statements of the two American journalists, of the British journalist Steve Cox (*The Independent*) and the Australian jouranlists Russel Anderson and Bob Muntz, and also of the Italian priest Stefani Renato, and especially the images that British journalist Max Stahl (Yorkshire Television) managed to smuggle out of the country, awakened the world from its apathy and were responsible for alerting many people to the alarming situation in East Timor. In Portugal, Australia and other countries, many demonstrations and protests took place. The Portuguese Prime Minister, in a speech to the Portuguese Parliament, raised his voice *"in vehement and heartfelt repudiation of the ignoble and brutal violence of which the martyred people of Timor has been the victim, in yet another vile act of terror and intimidation on the part of the Indonesian authorities"*. He thus manifested his support for the Resolution condemning the massacre which was unanimously approved by the Portuguese Parliament the day after the massacre. In Portugal a day of national mourning was decreed (19/11/91).

The United States Senate approved a resolution on 21 November which states,*"the President should support the immediate introduction of a resolution in the General Assembly instructing the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to appoint a Special Rapporteur for East Timor to assist in the resolution of the East Timorese conflict in pursuit of the right of self-determination of the East Timorese people."* A letter signed by 52 of the 100 members of the Senate expressed to President Bush concern regarding the situation in East Timor. In it, the Senators request that American authorities give the mater greater attention and intervene more actively.

In Portugal, among the many petitions promoted by solidarity groups, schools, unions, youth groups, writers and artists, on 29 November an Open Letter to the President of the United States of America was presented to the public. Its signers express their *"concern for the situation of terror prevailing in East Timor"* and *"their perplexity at the illegal, iniquitous and unjustifiable acceptance of the annexation on the part of the American Administration, which has itself admitted* *that no genuine act of self-determination has taken place (...) We therefore appeal to the American government to put into practice a policy in accordance with international law and the United Nations resolutions"*.

One of the most important aspects of this document is the importance of its supporters, not only internationally famous intellectuals but also the President of the largest Portuguese university, the Anglican Bishop of Portugal, members of Parliament and a former Vice Prime Minister, a former Prime Minister and a former President (General Ramalho Eanes).

Holland, Canada and Denmark cut off aid to Indonesia. The Australian Council of Trade Unions organized boycotts in ports and airports, and supported the creation of a symbolic "*embassy*" of East Timor in Canberra, just a few meters away from the Indonesian Embassy. The Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans, threatened to have the Timorese and Australian demonstrators removed by force, but divisions existed among the Canberra authorities.

General Suharto, in the face of pressure from international public opinion, was forced to appoint a Committee of Inquiry. This Committee was made up of military officers and public servants, with only one Member of Parliament, and was headed by a retired general implicated in the repression against those who had opposed the regime.

In the first version of its report, the Committee — which heard almost no direct witnesses of the massacre — claimed that nineteen Timorese died. This is the same amount as the graves opened by the Army, and was designed to give credibility to this number.

Due to the statements of the foreign journalists who witnessed the massacre (and even of members of the Regional Assembly created by the occupiers) which indicated much higher numbers, the falsity of the report became increasingly obvious.

Australia and other countries, in order to hush the international clamor, brought pressure to bear on the Indonesian government to produce a more credible report. Finally, the Committee of Inquiry spoke of fifty deaths and condemned the behavior of the Indonesian troops. The Military Commander of East Timor, Brigadier General Rudolf Warouw, and the Commander of the Military Region of the Sonda Islands, located in Bali, Major General Sintong Panjantan, were removed from their posts and transferred. Battalions 303 of Jakarta and 700 of Sulawesi, which were involved in the massacres, returned to their barracks.

In spite of the contradictions and lies contained in the final version of the report of the Committee of Inquiry, the Governments of Australia, Japan and the United States greeted it as enough to warrant continued cooperation with Indonesia, although a certain pressure would be kept up so that the regime would investigate the matter more thoroughly.

12. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND THE ROLE OF PORTUGAL AND OF INDONESIAN PUBLIC OPINION

For the first time after many thousand of Timorese had "*disappeared*" since 1975 at the hands of the occupiers, General Suharto decided in December to create a Commission of Honor to determine who had been responsible for the massacre on 12 November 1991, and investigate what had happened to nearly ninety missing persons (in addition to the fifty dead ackowledged by the Committee of Inquiry). In spite of the initial refusal to accept any international commission, even from the UN, to investigate the events, on 8 January 1992 — nearly two months after the massacre, and when many witnesses had already been arrested, killed or tortured to the point of making any "*confession*" — Indonesia finally agreed to accept an investigation carried out by a representative of the United Nations.

Two fundamental facts were behind these decisions:

— In the first place, the pressure of international public opinion, which continued to manifest its concern and criticize the behavior of the Indonesian military officers and authorities, with an intensity never before felt by the regime of General Suharto.

— On the other hand, the struggles between the hard-liners and the more moderate sectors defending greater openness of the regime, both internally and in relation to East Timor.

The Dili massacre and the subsequent inquiries were also indicative of the internal confrontation between these two factions in the struggle for power in Indonesia, having in view the parliamentary elections of June 1992 and the Presidential elections of 1993. While Generals Benny Murdani (Defense Minister) and Try Sutrismo (Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces) had opposed the visit of the Portuguese parliamentary delegation to East Timor and defended a hardline stance, the minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas and General Suharto himself showed some signs of flexibility, manifesting not only their wish that the visit take place but also defending more diplomatic and moderate policies. The refusal to allow the visit of the parliamentary delegation, on the one hand, and the Santa Cruz massacre, on the other, were two aspects in this factional struggle within the regime. This was followed by substitutions in the military commands decided by the President of Indonesia in October 1991 which the Armed Forces refused to accept, forcing General Suharto to go on television in order to explain. The Vice-Chief of the Army High Command, General Sahala Rajaguguk, was involved, and he was still in his post a month after General Wisnoyo (a relative of Suharto's wife) had been named to replace him. The same occured with General Sudiono Hartas, when General Suharto attempted to replace him with Air Marshal Teddy Rusdi. In this contest, the demonstrations by Indonesian students criticizing the massacres and the occupation of East Timor and defending the democratization of the regime take on particular importance.

Many Indonesians felt that the dignity of the military is affected each time it massacres unarmed citizens, as it has done so often in East Timor, in Aceh and in other regions of the Indonesian archipelago and even in Jakarta, when it massacred Muslims in Tanjung Priok in September 1984. The prestige of the Indonesian Armed Forces, gained in the struggle for freedom from ne colonial yoke, in the forties, is negatively affected every day they oppress a people and illegally occupy a territory with the right to self-determination.

For the first time, even the Indonesian Catholic bishops have publicly criticized the behavior os some Indonesian military officers. His Holiness Pope John Paul II has also sent a special envoy to Timor on a fact-finding mission.

Now that the Berlin Wall has fallen, now that the countries in Eastern Europe have moved toward democracy and the East-West confrontation has come to an end, even those who used the danger of Communist advances as a threat have no arguments left. Although the genocide of the Timorese people can never be justified, it is even less possible to do so today. East Timor has the right to self-determination, and Indonesia has the right to an image of dignity and prestige in accord with its long and extremely rich cultural traditions.

Portugal can and must carry out an important role in the resolution of the problem of East Timor. It is Portugal's responsibility to do so, in terms of international law and of historical and moral imperatives. For it to acknowledge completely its responsibilities as administering power, without usurping the place of the people of East Timor and their representatives, is crucial to the achievement of genuine self-determination.

To recognize past hesitations and errors, and to atone for its incoherence, weaknesses and unjustified yielding and above all for the negligence which has nearly always characterized its treatment of East Timor, Portugal must play a more active role on the international scene in the defense of the rights of the Timorese and in the constant support of their just aspirations.

In this context the diplomatic initiatives of the Portuguese government, as referred to in the statement of the EEC Council of Ministers on 3 December 1991, have been important. Equally important have been the initiatives of the President of Portugal, who sent letters to the Pope, to the President of the United States and to other Chiefs of State, calling their attention to the gravity of the situation in East Timor. His Holiness John Paul II, in an apparent reaction to the letter he had received from Dr. Mário Soares, broke his long silence on Timor and in his speech to the diplomatic corps accredited in the Vatican on 11 January 1992 stated that *"a persistent dialogue is necessary, in order that all elements of Timorese reality may launch the foundations of political development in harmony with the aspirations of the population."*

A few days before, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, Mons. Ximenes Belo, declared that the issue of Timor *"can only be resolved through dialogue, great open dialogue between everyone involved: Portugal, Indonesia, the Timorese who are here (in Timor), the Resistance parties and the Church."* The bishop appealed once again for a referendum so that the people could freely choose their own future.

On a short trip to France, the President of Portugal had important talks on East Timor with the President of France, François Mitterand, and with the recently elected Secretary-General of the United Nations, Butros-Gali. Both were sympathetic and attentive to the drama of Timor. Continuing his journey to the United States, in an meeting with George Bush which took place on 13 January 1992, the matter of Timor was brought up by the American president himself. Mário Soares remarked on the necessity to respect human rights, the United Nations resolutions and the right to self-determination of the people of East Timor. When the meeting was over, the President of Portugal was convinced that the President of the United States had been receptive, and expressed his hope that the actions of the American administration toward Indonesia regarding the occupation of Timor may undergo certain changes.

With the 12 November massacre, the situation has changed regarding East Timor. In spite of all the Indonesian attempts to minimize these events, in spite of the hypocrisy of governments (as is the case with those of America, Australia, Japan, and others who considered the Indonesian Committee of Inquiry's report enough to justify maintaining their aid to Jakarta), this time international reaction has made itself felt. Although the climate of terror persists, the arrests, torture and murders still occur, and the death squads still act in East Timor, and in spite of the Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed forces General Try Sutrismo's affirmation that *"as soon as the inquiry and the investigation are over we are going to clean up Timor and destroy all the separatist elements which have attacked the dignity of the Government"*, the drama of Timor has become known worldwide, and is troubling the consciences of many countries .

It remains to be seen whether international pressure will continue to be strongly applied toward self-determination for East Timor, which is the only way to eliminate the cause underlying human rights violations in this country.

International apathy and short memories are the oppressed Maubere people's worst enemy. If general indifference once again takes hold, the genocide of the people of East Timor will continue. But if the world shows its revulsion against this crime, it can be stopped, and the bloodshed can come to an end.

After sixteen years of terror, it is time for United States, Australia, Japan and so many other democratic countries to stop supporting the Indonesian occupation of Timor. It is more than time to prevent a genocide comparable only to that of Pol Pot's Cambodia from continuing indefinitely.

It is up to men and women all over the world to raise their voices in protest against this ignoble crime wich has cost the lives of more than a third of the Timorese population.

The only strengths underlying the courage of the Maubere peole are the justice and the right of their cause, in their resistance against the occupation. Lacking any military support from abroad, only the solidarity of Portugal, Australia, America and other countries — and of the Indonesians themselves — can save them from genocide.

Oporto, 20 January 1992
António Pinto Barbedo de Magalhães

TABLE I

AREAS OF STATES AND TERRITORIES

STATE or TERRITORY	Area in Square Km	STATE or TERRITORY	Area in Square Km
VATICAN	0,44	CANARY ISLANDS (E)	7.270
MONACO	1,49	PUERTO RICO	8.897
MACAO	16	CYPRUS	9.251
NAURU	21	LEBANON	10.400
TUVALU (UK)	26	JAMAICA	10.962
BERMUDAS (UK)	53	QATAR	11.000
S. MARINO	61	GAMBIA	11.295
LIECHTENSTEIN	159	FALKLANDS (UK)	11.961
ST. CHRISTOPHER NEVIS (UK)	262	BAHAMAS	13.935
SEYCHELLES	280	VANUATU	14.763
MALDIVES	298	SWAZILAND	17.363
MALTA	316	KUWAIT	17.818
GRENADA	344	FIJI	18.272
ST. VINCENT GRENADINES (UK)	388	**EAST TIMOR (P)**	18.899
BARBADOS	431	NEW CALEDÓNIA	19.058
ANTEGUA / BARBUDA	442	EL SALVADOR	21.393
ANDORRA	465	DJIBOUTI	22.000
SINGAPORE	581	BELIZE	22.965
GUAM (USA)	549	RWANDA	26.338
ST. LUCIA (UK)	616	HAITI	27.750
BAHREIN	622	BURUNDI	27.834
KIRIBUTI	728	GUINEA EQUATORIAL	28.051
TONGA	748	SOIOMON ISLANDS	28.446
DOMINICA	751	ALBÂNIA	28.700
ISLAND OF S. MIGUEL (P)	757	LESOTHO	30.355
ARCHIPELAGO MADEIRA (P)	795	BELGIUM	30.513
DUTCH ANTILLES (N)	961	TAIWAN	35.981
S. TOMÉ E PRINCIPE	1.001	GUINEA BISSAU	36.125
HONG KONG	1.061	SWITZERLAND	41.295
MARTINIQUE	1.102	NETHERLANDS	41.4473
GUADALUPE	1.779	DENMARK	43.069
MICRONÉSIA (USA-UN)	1.854	ESTÓNIA	45.000
MAURITIUS	2.045	BHUTAN	47.000
COMOROS	2.171	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	48.734
REUNION	2.510	COSTA RICA	50.700
LUXEMBOURG	2.586	CONTINENTAL PORTUGAL	88.500
SAMOA	2.842	UNITED KINGDON	244.046
FRENCH POLYNESIA (F)	2.842	INDONÉSIA	2.000.000
CAPE VERDE	4.035	AUSTRÁLIA	7.686.848
TRINDAD AND TOBAGO	5.130	UNITED STATES OF AMÉRICA	9.372.614
BRUNEI	5.765		

(...) TERRITORIES BELONGING TO OR ADMINISTERED BY:
(E) SPAIN — (F) FRENCH — (N) NETHERLANDS — (P) PORTUGAL — (UK) UNITED KINGDON — (USA) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TABLE II

VOTES ON THE RESOLUTIONS ON EAST TIMOR APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1975 - 1980 AND 1982) OR BY THE 4th COMMITEE OF THE UN

COUNTRIES	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
AFGHANISTAN	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ALBÄNIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ALGERIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ANGOLA	[1]	[1]	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ANTIGUA BARBUDA	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	N
ARGENTINA	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	N
AUSTRALIA	**Y**	**A**	**A**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**
AUSTRIA	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
BAHAMAS	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
BAHREIN	Y	A	A	A	A	A	N	N
BANGLADESH	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
BARBADOS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
BELGIUM	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
BELIZE	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	Y	Y
BENIN	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
BHUTAN	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
BOLIVIA	Y	A	A	A	A	N	N	A
BOTSWANA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
BRAZIL	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**
BRUMA	(a)	(a)	A	A	A	(a)	A	A
BULGARIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(a)	(a)	(a)
BURUNDI	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
BYELORUSSIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CAMAROONS	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A
CANADA	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**N**	**N**	**N**
CAPE VERDE	**[1]**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	(a)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
CHAD	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
CHILE	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
CHINA	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**
COLOMBIA	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	A
COMOROS	[1]	(a)	Y	(a)	(a)	(a)	N	(a)
CONGO	(a)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
COSTA RICA	A	A	A	(a)	Y	A	Y	A
CUBA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CYPRUS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
DEM. KAMPUCHEA	(a)	Y	(a)	(a)	(a)	N	N	N
DEM. YEMEN	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
DENMARK	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**
DJIBOUTI	[1]	[1]	A	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
DOMINICA	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	(a)	(a)	A
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	(a)	A	A	A	A	(a)	N	A
ECUADOR	Y	Y	Y	(a)	(a)	A	A	A
EGYPT	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
EL SALVADOR	Y	A	A	A	A	A	N	N
ETHIOPIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FIJI	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	N
FINLAND	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
FRANCE	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**
GABON	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A
GAMBIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(a)	(a)	N
GERMAN D.R.	Y	Y	Y	Y	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
GERMAN F.R.	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**
GHANA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

COUNTRIES	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
GREECE	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**
GRENADA	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
GUATEMALA	A	A	A	A	A	(a)	N	N
GUINEA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
GUINEA EQUATORIAL	Y	Y	Y	(a)	Y	(a)	(a)	(a)
GUINEA-BISSAU	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**
GUYANA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
HAITI	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
HONDURAS	(a)	A	A	(a)	N	N	N	N
HUNGARY	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A
ICELAND	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
INDIA	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**
INDONESIA	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**
IRAN	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	(a)
IRAQ	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N
IRELAND	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y
ISRAEL	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
ITALY	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**
IVORY COAST	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A
JAMAICA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A
JAPAN	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**
JORDAN	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
KENYA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
KUWAIT	**Y**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**(a)**	**N**	**N**
LAO P.D.R.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(a)	Y
LEBANON	(a)	A	(a)	A	A	Y	N	A
LESOTHO	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
LIBERIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
LIBYAN A.J.	A	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
LUXEMBOURG	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**
MADAGASCAR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MALASIA	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
MALAWI	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MALDIVES	[1]	A	N	N	N	N	N	N
MALI	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MALTA	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
MAURITANIA	A	N	N	N	A	A	A	A
MAURITIUS	A	Y	(a)	Y	(a)	(a)	(a)	Y
MEXICO	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
MONGOLIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(a)	(a)
MOROCCO	A	N	N	N	A	A	A	N
MOZAMBIQUE	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**
NEPAL	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
NETHERLANDS	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**
NEW ZEALAND	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N
NICARAGUA	A	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
NIGER	Y	(a)	Y	Y	Y	Y	(a)	A
NIGERIA	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A
NORWAY	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
OMAN	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
PAKISTAN	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	N
PANAMA	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A
PAPUA N. GUINEA	[1]	A	A	N	N	N	N	N
PARAGUAY	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N
PERU	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
PHILIPPINES	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
POLAND	Y	Y	Y	(a)	(a)	A	A	A
PORTUGAL	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**
QUATAR	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N
RUANDA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
RUMANIA	Y	Y	Y	(a)	A	A	A	A
S TOME E PRINCIPE	**[1]**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**	**Y**
SAINT LUCIA	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	Y	Y	Y	N

COUNTRIES	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
SAMOA	[1]	[1]	A	A	A	(a)	A	A
SAUDI ARABIA	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
SELOMON ISLAND	[1]	[1]	[1]	(a)	(a)	(a)	A	N
SENEGAL	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		A
SEYCHELLES	[1]	(a)	(a)	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
SIERRA LEONE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SINGAPORE	A	(a)	N	N	N	N	N	N
SOMALIA	(a)	A	(a)	A	(a)	N	A	A
SPAIN	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**
SRI LANKA	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
ST.VINCENT GRENADINES	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	(a)	(a)	(a)
SUDAN	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N
SURINAME	[1]	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
SWAZILAND	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SWEDEN	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A
SYRIA	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N
TANZANIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
THAILAND	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
TOGO	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
TRINIDAD TOBAGO	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
TUNISIA	(a)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
TURKEY	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
U.A.EMIRATES	Y	A	A	A	A	A	N	N
UGANDA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
UKRAINE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
UNITED KINGDOM	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**	**A**
UNITED STATES	**A**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**	**N**
UPPER VOLTA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
URUGUAY	A	N	N	N	N	N	A	N
USSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
VANUATU	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	Y	Y
VENEZUELA	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
VIET NAM	[1]	[1]	Y	(a)	Y	Y	Y	Y
YEMEN	(a)	A	(a)	(a)	N	N	(a)	N
YUGOSLAVIA	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
ZAIRE	A	A	N	N	N	A	A	A
ZAMBIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ZIMBABWE	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	[1]	Y	Y	Y

Notes:

[1] Non-Member of the UN
(a) Absent at the time of voting
Y Voted "Yes"
N Voted "No"
A Voted to abstain
1981 Vote on the 4th Committee

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